
Don Bosco Malish is an accomplished programme management leader and analyst with over two decades of experience leading governance, human rights advocacy, policy analysis and grant management initiatives across Africa. He has worked in conflict and post conflict settings designing strategic peacebuilding interventions, protecting human rights defenders and championing media law reforms to support open civic space.
(OPINION / Don Bosco Malish) – Election Before Constitution: South Sudan’s High Risk Shortcut to Legitimacy
South Sudan is moving towards a defining moment: whether to hold elections before completing the permanent constitution and national census, or to extend a political arrangement that has already exceeded its intended lifespan.
The idea of conducting elections under an incomplete transition may be legally possible and politically attractive, but it carries serious risks. What is at stake is not only the legitimacy of the next government, but also whether the country moves forward or slides back into violence.
A bold shortcut or a dangerous detour?
The argument for separating elections from the permanent constitution and census is based on the belief that the country needs a renewed mandate more urgently than perfect systems. Supporters say the Transitional Constitution can be adjusted and the peace agreement re-sequenced to allow elections under a transitional framework, rather than waiting for a fully established constitutional order.
However, this approach raises difficult questions. If the legal framework is knowingly incomplete, what guarantees exist that those who lose the election will accept the results? And what prevents the winners from using the gaps to extend their hold on power?
How will parliamentarians accept their own potential exit?
Any attempt to advance this idea must confront the self interest of parliamentarians. Many members of the current legislature, who entered through political appointments or power sharing arrangements, know that competitive elections could reduce their numbers or remove them entirely. Why would a majority willingly support reforms that could remove them from office?
This leads to further uncomfortable questions:
• What incentives might convince incumbents to vote for reforms that could cost them their seats? Could political guarantees, soft landing arrangements or future roles offer reassurance?
• Can discussions on term limits, pensions or immunity packages be held openly without appearing to reward wrongdoing?
• How can the proposal be presented as an act of statesmanship (leaving office for the good of the country) rather than as political defeat?
Without clear answers, the proposal risks failing inside parliament before the public even hears it.
Security actors, private loyalties and the danger of new violence
Even if legal amendments pass, the major concern remains the security sector. Many security actors, from senior commanders to local forces, still hold personal, ethnic or factional loyalties above institutional discipline. Elections without a permanent constitution and census may heighten fears among elites that they are entering a zero sum contest with no safety net.
Key questions follow:
• If parts of the security sector remain loyal to individuals rather than the state, who will ensure that election disputes are settled through law rather than force?
• What minimum reform, unification and depoliticisation is required to ensure that elections reduce rather than provoke violence?
• Can codes of conduct, strong monitoring and regional guarantees realistically restrain actors who view violence as their final insurance policy?
Unless these security issues are addressed as political challenges, not simply technical tasks, early elections could reignite conflict.
Making the idea acceptable in Juba
To gain support in the Transitional National Legislature and among political elites, the proposal needs more than strong legal arguments; it needs a compelling political story. That story may rely on three themes:
• Controlled risk, not dangerous recklessness: Describe early elections as a managed exit from constant extensions, with basic safeguards, rather than a blind risk.
• Shared sacrifice for national survival: Show that all sides, the presidency, opposition leaders and current MPs, will give up something, but that the alternative is decline, isolation and possible renewed violence.
• A transitional contract, not a final settlement: Make clear that this is an interim arrangement to restore legitimacy and unlock the constitutional process, not the country’s permanent political structure.
Still, a difficult question remains: can a parliament made up largely of appointees and power sharing beneficiaries agree to reduce its own size without guarantees for personal and collective security?
Selling the idea to the international community
To external partners, the idea must be presented not as a technical shortcut but as a responsible response to a prolonged transition. International actors will ask whether this is a real step towards democracy or simply a new way to extend the current order.
To gain support, advocates should:
• Ground the proposal in principle: Link re-sequenced elections to commitments on human rights, civic space, women’s and youth inclusion and a time bound constitutional completion.
• Provide measurable milestones: Present a clear plan with specific steps, such as legal reforms, readiness of the electoral commission, basic security guarantees and mechanisms for resolving disputes.
• Invite shared responsibility: Ask regional and international partners to take defined roles in observation, dispute mediation and security oversight, making them invested in the process and its outcomes.
Yet one final question cannot be avoided: if the international community supports elections under an incomplete framework that some citizens see as unsafe or unfair, will it accept responsibility if the process goes wrong?
In the end, the case for early elections under a transitional framework is about managing risk. Is South Sudan safer holding imperfect elections soon, or delaying them again in the name of “readiness”? Any argument in favour must be honest about who gains, who loses and what protections are required to ensure the cure does not become worse than the disease.
Disclaimer
Access Radio® provides space for a range of viewpoints. The opinions expressed here are the author’s alone and do not represent the views of Access Radio® or its editorial team. Contributors are responsible for verifying facts. To submit an opinion, email news [at] radioyei.org.
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